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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
In most of the jurisdictions in which recovery has been granted
for prenatal injuries, two conditions appear to be essential: (1) the
infant must have been viable at the time of the negligent act; and
(2) it must have been born alive. Tursi v. New England Windsor Co.,
19 Conn. Supp. 242, 111 A.2d 14 (1955); Amann v. Faidy, 415
Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953). However, the New Hampshire
court in two recent cases, Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147
A.2d 108 (1958) and Poliquin v. Macdonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135
A.2d 249 (1957), seems to take the view that if either of the two
above conditions is -present, recovery will be granted. In the Bennett
case the court held that -an infant born alive can maintain an action
to recover ,for prenatal injuries inflicted upon it by the tort of another,
even if it had not reached the state of a viable foetus at the time of
the injury. Accord, Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497
(1960). On the other hand, in the Poliquin case the court said that
a foetus having reached hat period of prenatal maturity where it is
capable of independent life is a person, and if such child dies in the
womb as a result of another's negligence, an action of recovery may
be maintained in its 'behalf. Accord, Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d
901 (Ky. 1955).
Thus, the courts are taking the more liberal view, and are allow-
ing recovery for prenatal injuries. Most courts hold that the child
must have been viable and born alive before recovery can be granted.
Some courts 'hold -that the child need not have been viable so long
as it was born alive. A few courts permit recovery even where the
child is 'born dead, provided it was viable when the injury occurred.
The only other possibility, for which no authority has 'been found, is
where the child was neither viable at the time of injury nor born alive.
Nick George Zegrea
Wills--Subsequent Will Containing Express Clause
of Revocation-Time Revocation Takes Effect
TestatLrix executed two wills, the first in 1954 and the second
in 1955. The later will contained a revocation clause which expressly
revoked all wills previously made. Both wills were left in the custody
of a bank. In 1956 testatrix withdrew the 1955 will stating that she
wished -to make a new will. The new will was never made and the
1955 will was never found, and so was presumptively destroyed
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animo revocandi. An unsigned copy of the 1955 will was retained
by the bank and exhibited in evidence. After death of the testatrix
the 1954 -will was presented to the chancery court and offered for
probate. The court ordered the 1954 will probated as the true last
will and testament of testatrix. Held, affirmed. A duly executed will
in existence when testatrix died was not revoked -by a subsequent will
not in existence at the death of the testatrix, even though the subse-
quent will contained a revocation clause; the revocation clause speaks
not at the time of execution but at the death or the testatrix. Timber-
lake v. State-Planters Bank of Commerce & Trusts, 115 S.E.2d 39
(Va. 1960).
The Timberlake 'holding will 'be of particular interest to the courts
of West Virginia since both Virginia and West Virginia have sub-
stantially the same statutory provisions concerning the revocation
and revival of wills. The principal case expressly overrules the earlier
view taken -by Virginian courts as stated in Rudisill's Ex'r. v. Rodes,
70 Va. (29 Gratt.) 147 (1877) which held that the effective time
of revocation 'by a subsequent will containing a revoking cause was
at the time of execution of the revoking will.
The problems of revocation and revival are so intermingled and
virtually inseparable that it is necessary to consider them jointly.
There is a great deal of confusion in this general area due to a num-
ber of contributing causes. Much of the confusion stems from the
dual origin of the law of wills in both the common law and ecclesiasti-
cal law.
Prior to the Will's Act of 1837 in England there were two dis-
tinct views as to the status of a prior will upon the revocation of a
subsequent revoking will. The common law rule 'was that the prior
will was automatically 'evived by the destruction of the later revoking
will. 1 PAGE, WILLS § 472 (3d ed. 1941). Under the ecclesiastical
rule the intent of the testator controlled, so that whether revival took
-place depended on the intent manifested. Id. § 471. The Statute of
Victoria provided that a will could be revived only by a new will or
codicil, or reexecution of the prior will, and the courts construed
revocation 'by subsequent instrument to be effective from the date of
its execution. Note, 28 Ky. L.J. 227 (1940). Consequently, both
the common law rule and ,the ecclesiastical rule were, in effect,
abolished in England.
However, in the United States these rules have been reincarnated
to meet the needs of the various jurisdictions. There are at least five
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views as to the effect upon the prior will by revocation of the revoking
will: (1) 'the earlier Will is revived ipso facto (common law rule);
(2) the earlier will is revived unless an intention to the contrary
appears (common law rule modified by the ecclesiastical rule); (3)
the earlier will is -not -revived unless reexecuted or republished (Eng-
lish view after adoption of the Statute of Victoria); (4) the earlier
will is not revived unless intent to revive appears (post-Statute of
Victoria view modified 'by the ecclesiastical rule); (5) revival is
solely a question of intent (ecclesiastical rule). Annot., 28 A.L.R.
911 (1924). These views are allocated haphazardly among the
various states, each jurisdiction basing its view according to its sta-
tutory requirements and individual theories. Many states have enacted
statutes affecting the doctrines of revocation and revival. See Zacha-
rias & Maschinot, Revocation and Revival of Wills, 26 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 107 (1947). Of this group, Virginia, West Virginia and Ken-
tucky have enacted substantially similar statutes based on the twenty-
second section of -the Statute of Victoria providing that no will or
codicil in any manner revoked shall 'be revived otherwise than by
reexecution, or by a codicil properly executed -and showing intent to
revive the revoked instrument. See W. VA. CODE ch. 41, art. 1 § 8
(Michie 1955).
In addition, the ,three states also have substantially the same
statute on revocation, each statute providing that no will shall be
revoked unless by -a subsequent will or codicil, by some writing de-
claring the intent to revoke and executed in the manner in which a
will is required to be executed, or by a physical act of destruction
on the part of the testator. W. VA. CODE ch. 41, art. 1 § 7 (Michie
1955). These statutes make no attempt to define the moment of
time at which revocation 'by a later instrument takes effect. While
in West Virginia 'the problem has not yet been before the courts,
Kentucky is firmly committed to the view 'that revocation takes place
at the time of execution, and Virginia until the ruling in the principal
case also held the same conclusion. Slaughter's Adm'r. v. Wyman,
228 Ky. 226, 14 S.W.2d 777 (1929); Rudisill's Ex'r. v. Rodes, supra.
The rationale of the Timberlake decision is that a will is an
ambulatory instrument having no life or force until the death of its
maker, and then only if admitted to probate. The court took the
view that an express clause of revocation, being an integral part of
the will, can have no separate legal effect, but instead can only
become operative at death when the whole will 'takes effect. It cannot
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be said that such reasoning is entirely without logic. Yet, when the
result of this holding is considered objectively, divorced from its
sequence of logic and compared with the result proposed by the dis-
senting opinion and the Kentucky view, the open comparison reveals
the undersirability of the majority holding.
The court reasons that revocation of the first will never took
place so that the first will was continually in effect, and since no
revocation occurred the question of revival is never reached. In
essence the Virginia court is applying one aspect of the common
law rule (that revocation takes effect at death) to the English post-
Statute of Victoria rule that a prior will can be revoked only under
the provisions of the statute. This is a brand new development in
the law of wills, 'but instead of being a break away from the fog
engulfing this area, this holding only -thickens the 'haze. The purpose
of the Statute of Victoria was to avoid the evils of the ecclesiastical
and common law rules, 'but this interpretation of the Virginia statute
partly exhumes the common law rule.
Under the ruling of the principal case -a testator can -make any
number of wills, each revoking the previous, yet regardless of how
many wills are made none are revoked until the death of the testator
at which time the earlier wills are all defeated in a reverse chain
reaction. It is highly unlikely that the testator upon destruction of a
later revoking will thinks that his earlier will is still operative since he
has expressly stated that 'he 'has revoked the former will. To ration-
alize as the majority opinion does that the testator could avoid this
result by physical destruction of the earlier will is no justification for
an essentially 'bad rule. By revocation of a later revoking -will, the
testator has expressed his final intent to be that 'he wishes neither of
the wills to operate. It is mere speculation to say that he would prefer
the first will to no will.
Another basis for attacking the majority opinion in this case is
that the decision is entirely dependent upon the presumption by the
court that the second will was destroyed by the testatrix animo re-
vocandi. This presumption is based on the authority of Tate v. Wren,
185 Va. 773, 784, 40 S.E.2d 188, 193 (1946) which held that where
a testator was known to 'have made a will but the will could not be
found, it is a rebuttable presumption that such will was destroyed by
the testator with the intent -to revoke. Being a rebuttable presumption
evidence may be received to overcome the presumption. The facts
of the principal case do overcome this presumption. The evidence
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shows the testatrix withdrew the second will from the bank stating
that she intended to change 'her will by the making of a new will.
The intent to revoke the second will was dependent upon the making
of a third will. It appears the doctrine of dependent relative revoca-
tion would apply to this set of facts and the second -will would not
have 'been revoked. However, this line of reasoning was apparently
not advanced by counsel 'and so is merely parenthetical to the scope
and purpose of this comment.
The plain language of the West Virginia statute on revocation
puts revocation 'by subsequent will on the same footing as revocation
by some other writing, and revocation by physical destruction. There
is no distinction made and none is suggested by the statute. Instead
all three methods of revocation appear equal. Revocation by some
other writing and revocation by physical destruction undeniably
take effect immediately. There is no basis to suppose that the
legislature intended to allow two methods of immediate revocation
while the third method could not take effect until death. Furthermore,
if revocation could not take effect until death then 'the revival statute
allowing revival only by reexecution or republishing would be mean-
ingless in the case of revocation by a later revoking will since the
,testator would not be alive to revive it.
The dissenting opinion of the principal case takes the view that
the first will was revoked at the time of execution of the second will
by virtue of the express clause of revocation. The first will would
then 'be null and void, and since it ,had never been revived under the
provisions of the revival statute, 'the testatrix died intestate. This
appears to be the more reasonable of the two views since the ex-
pressed intent of the testatrix would be carried out and the purposes
of the statute would be accomplished.
John James McKenzie
Worlnen's Compensation-Award as a Proper Subject for
Remittitur in an Action Against Third Parties
A, -while working for B, a subscriber to the West Virginia Com-
pensation Fund, was electrocuted due to the alleged negligence of C.
A's administratrix, after recovering workmen's compensation through
B, received a judgment against C, no part of which was offset by the
workmen's compensation award. Held, reversing the verdict upon
other grounds, that the amount of compensation received for the
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